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Abstract
Eyal and Sirer’s selfish mining strategy has demonstrated that Bit-
coin system is not secure even if 50% of total mining power is held
by altruistic miners [2]. Since then, researchers have been investi-
gating either to improve the efficiency of selfish mining, or how to
defend against it, typically in a single selfish miner setting. Yet there
is no research on a selfish mining strategies concurrently used by mul-
tiple miners in the system. The effectiveness of such selfish mining
strategies and their required mining power under such multiple selfish
miners setting remains unknown.
In this paper, a preliminary investigation and our findings of self-
ish mining strategy used by multiple miners are reported. In addi-
tion, the conventional model of Bitcoin system is slightly redesigned
to tackle its shortcoming: namely, a concurrency of individual mining
processes. Although a theoretical analysis of selfish mining strategy
under this setting is yet to be established, the current findings based
on simulations is promising and of great interest. In particular, our
work shows that a lower bound of power threshold required for selfish
mining strategy decreases in proportion to a number of selfish min-
ers. Moreover, there exist Nash equilibria where all selfish miners in
the system do not change to an honest mining strategy and simulta-
neously earn their unfair amount of mining reward given that they
equally possess sufficiently large mining power. Lastly, our new model
yields a power threshold for mounting selfish mining strategy slightly
greater than one from the conventional model.
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1 Introduction
Originally invented by Nakamoto [5], a blockchain is used to securely record
a ledger of Bitcoin payment transactions amongst Internet users. The great
success of blockchain and Bitcoin is based on an application of cryptographic
puzzle, namely Proof-of-Work, and an economic incentive for miners, whom
are an underlying workforce of Bitcoin system. In other words, anyone on
the Internet with a sufficient amount of computational power can be a miner
and solve the cryptographic puzzle to earn Bitcoin.
Due to Nakamoto’s analysis, it has been widely believed that the Bitcoin
system will remain secure as long as at least half of the total mining power
are held by non-malicious miners, who honestly mine blocks according to the
blockchain protocol [5]. In particular, the analysis of an attacker succeeding
in double-spending his Bitcoin was modelled as a 1-dimensional random walk
with an infinite time and one absorbing bound. Intuitively, the attacker will
succeed if his mining power is more than half of the total power in the system.
However, a selfish mining strategy allows a malicious miner who possesses
at least a third of total mining power to gain more than his fair share and
could consequently disrupt Bitcoin system. As first demonstrated in Eyal
and Sirer’s work [2], this strategy which secretly builds a private blockchain
and strategically releases blocks causes honest miners to mine on a block that
will eventually be replaced by selfish miner’s. As a result, honest miners will
receive less mining profit, and might stop mining or even participate in selfish
mining together with the first selfish miner. In any case, a percentage of total
mining power held by the selfish miner will increase and further improve the
effectiveness of selfish mining strategy. Therefore, Bitcoin system is not safe
against selfish mining strategy even if a half of the total mining power is held
by honest miners.
Despite of such importance, there is yet no research on a selfish min-
ing strategy simultaneously used by multiple miners. To the best of our
knowledge, most works so far have only focused on one malicious miner us-
ing selfish mining strategy and the others employing honest mining strategy
[2, 3, 7, 6, 8]. However, a number of miners in Bitcoin system could use the
selfish mining strategy at the same time. Whether the selfish mining strategy
is still effective in such situation has not yet been investigated.
In addition, none of previous works so far has considered a concurrency
resulted from individually mining and could misestimate a power threshold
of selfish mining strategy as a result. In other words, a mining process in
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Bitcoin system has been widely modelled as a single entity randomly as-
signing new blocks to their owners according to their mining powers [2, 8].
On the contrary, miners in practical individually mine on their locally-stored
blockchain and consequently create new blocks independently. Therefore, the
widely used model might not well represent Bitcoin system and thus previous
findings of the power threshold might be lower or greater than the actual one.
For these reasons, we have started a preliminary investigation into an
effectiveness of selfish mining strategy employed by multiple miners with our
new model of Bitcoin system. In essence, our model better reflects the con-
currency of individually mining and further assumes that there is always at
least an honest miner in the system. Such honest miner collectively rep-
resents altruistic miners in Bitcoin community who believe in a long-term
economic impact of a security attack and consequently adhere to the original
blockchain protocol [1].
Despite a lack of theoretical analysis and some limitations, our findings is
useful and provides an insight toward an effectiveness of selfish mining strat-
egy used by multiple miners. We also consider our work to be a complement
to Kiayias’s game-theoretical analysis of blockchain mining [4]. In particular,
our work provides a number of contributions as follows.
1. Under a system where there are multiple selfish miners, the least amount
of mining power that could allow a selfish miner to earn his unfair
amount of mining reward becomes lesser in proportion to a number of
selfish miners in the system.
2. Given a specific power configuration or a specific allocation of mining
power, there exist Nash equilibria where multiple miners use a selfish
mining strategy and simultaneously gain their mining reward greater
than their percentage of total mining power.
3. From a perspective of security, an amount of mining power required to
completely secure against a selfish mining strategy remains the same
regardless of a number of selfish miners in the system.
4. Due to a simplified model of Bitcoin system that are widely used in
literatures, all estimated mining power to effectively mount a selfish
mining strategy and other attacks so far could be slightly underesti-
mated.
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In the rest of this paper, our work are presented as follows. Firstly a
literature related to our study is reviewed. Then we briefly describe our
model and specifically point out any difference to the conventional model
of Bitcoin system. Subsequently our simulation settings and their results
are demonstrated and discussed. Finally we concludes this paper with our
findings and future work.
2 Related Work
After Eyal and Sirer’s seminal work [2], a number of studies have advanced
the research of selfish mining strategy. For example, Go¨bel and his colleagues
extended the original study by using a spatial Poisson point process to model
a network of miners to better account for an effect of network delay [3]. Their
findings showed a relatively high number of blocks in a blockchain and conse-
quently a great amount of mining reward for every miner if there is no miner
the using selfish mining strategy. Nonetheless, the selfish mining strategy
still allows a miner to gain his mining reward greater than his percentage of
total mining power once his mining power is sufficiently large.
On the one hand, some studies have improved the original selfish mining
strategy to be more effective and consequently gain higher amount of mining
reward than the original one [7, 6]. In addition to optimising the original
selfish mining strategy, a combination with other attacks such as an eclipse
attack could be used to further increase its success rate [6]. As a result, a
safety level of mining power required for Bitcoin system to be secure against
the selfish mining strategy became lower than 1/3 of the total mining power.
On the other hand, a number of researches proposed various methods
that improve blockchain protocol to better resist the selfish mining strategy,
though they were difficult to carry out in practical [8]. In particular, these
methods increased a power threshold or an amount of mining power required
for successfully mounting selfish mining strategy to some degree. However,
their methods including Zhang and Preneel’s required a good coordination
amongst the majority of miners to adopt them at a specific point of time to
prevent undesirable forking of the blockchain. Consequently, they were hard
to implement in Bitcoin system.
Whilst a game-theoretical analysis could provide a great insight into
miner’s decision whether to mount a selfish mining strategy, game theory
is based on an assumption of strong rationality and therefore might not re-
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flect altruistic miners in Bitcoin system. With regard to mining strategies
that strategically publish their hidden blocks, Kiayias and his colleagues
demonstrated that every miner will use an honest mining strategy if no one
possesses mining power greater than 30.8% of the total mining power [4].
However, their model was based on an assumption of rational miners; in
other words, miners always change their mining strategy to the most benefi-
cial one. Such assumption did not reflect altruistic miners, who adhere to the
original mining software due to a fear of long-term economic impact resulted
from any security attack.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no research that considers multiple
miners simultaneously employing a selfish mining strategy. In practical, a
selfish miner might not be able to immediately switch back and forth between
an honest mining strategy and the selfish mining strategy to best maximise
his mining reward. In other words, they might continuously use the selfish
mining strategy for some periods even if it is less profitable than the honest
mining strategy. A possible cause of selfish miner’s irrational decision could
be a lack of information; e.g. a current distribution of mining powers which
could be heavily fluctuating.
Furthermore, all works so far have modelled Bitcoin system in a slightly
unrealistic manner and could consequently misestimate a power threshold
required for the selfish mining strategy. That is, their models assumed that
there is always one miner successfully generating a block at each period.
However, miners in practical individually and concurrently mine blocks on
their locally-stored blockchain. As a result, there could be more than one
block generated in each period. Therefore, the actual power threshold might
be greater or lower than the power threshold that has been known so far.
3 Our Model of Bitcoin System
To tackle the shortcomings previously mentioned, the widely used model of
Bitcoin system is redesigned to reflect miners concurrently mining on their
locally-stored blockchains. In addition, an honest miner who collectively
represents altruistic miners in Bitcoin system is included into our model. As
a consequence, our model better represents Bitcoin system. In particular,
our model is described as follows.
• Each miner is denoted by i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, in which every miner i ∈
{1, 2, ..., N − 1} always uses the original selfish mining strategy [2] and
5
the N -th miner uses an honest mining strategy [5]. For the sake of
simplicity, all altruistic miners are treated as one honest miner and we
focus on the effect of varying number of selfish miners and their mining
powers.
• For each miner, his mining process on locally-stored blockchain is a
Bernoulli trial with a probability of successfully creating a block pi =
mi × d, where:
– mi ∈ [0, 1] denotes a relative mining power or a proportion of
total mining power that miner i possesses, and we refer to an
allocation of mining power to every miner as a power configuration
M = {mi|i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}} in which
∑N
i=1mi = 1;
– d ∈ [0, 1] represents a difficulty level of creating blocks, i.e., a
proportion of nonces that yield a hash value lower than a target
value given that all miners create the same block. Analogously, a
high value of d represents Bitcoin system with a high target value
and vice versa for a low value of d.
• Utility function Ui of each miner is defined as a relative reward or a
proportion of his blocks in the longest blockchain and thus Ui ∈ [0, 1] .
• Every miner is assumed to be directly connected to all other miners
and there is no communication delay in the network. Consequently,
any broadcast message regarding a discovery of new blocks is instanta-
neously received. However, if there is a number of messages simultane-
ously sent to the same recipient, an ordering of messages that will be
sequentially received is randomly chosen and thus all messages have an
equal probability of being first received.
Note that our model neither regards selfish miner’s network capability as
Eyal and Sirer’s model [2] nor favours altruistic miner’s one. Since network
capability and communication delay could greatly affect the effectiveness
of selfish mining strategy, a study involving them should be systematically
carried out and thus it is considered as a next step of this work.
Finally, it should be pointed out that a major difference between our
model and the conventional model is a mining process. In particular, the
mining process in the conventional model was modelled as a global entity
which generates new blocks and randomly assign them to miners according
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to their mining powers. On the other hand, our model mimics all of individual
mining processes and allows a number of miners to simultaneously generate
their blocks. For further details of the conventional model, readers should
refer to Eyal and Sirer’s work [2].
4 Simulation and Results
A series of discrete event simulations were carried out to observe an effective-
ness of selfish mining in three different settings: namely one selfish miner, two
selfish miners, and three selfish miners. In particular, a relative mining power
of selfish miner is varied by 0.01. Furthermore, there is one honest miner who
has the rest of mining power left from selfish miners’. Each simulation which
runs for 200,000 timesteps is then repeated 100 times to calculate an average
relative reward E [Ui] and its 95% confidence interval.
It is worth mentioning that parameter d of our model is fixed to 0.5 in
all simulations. Since d = 0.5 allows blocks to be frequently generated, the
resulted blockchain will be sufficiently long to extract meaningful results.
Together with 200,000 timesteps, a length of the resulted blockchain varies
from 40,000 - 90,000 blocks, which is analogous to 11 - 13 months’ worth of
Bitcoin’s blockchain.
In the following, simulation results will be shown and described for each
setting. Except for the case of three selfish miners, we compare simulation
results of our model and the conventional model’s. Furthermore, a simulation
result of our model when there is no selfish miner is included to demonstrate
a baseline behaviour of our model.
4.1 No Selfish Miner
In contrast to the conventional model, our model shows an interesting aspect
of the actual mining process: that is, a miner with the greatest amount of
mining power was given a mining reward slightly larger than his relative
power and vice versa for the other miners. As shown in figure 1, an honest
miner with a relative mining power of 0.4 received an amount of relative
reward 0.414, whereas all other miners (each with a power of 0.3) got slightly
lesser than their relative powers.
Nevertheless, our model captures one of the main characteristics of Bit-
coin mining. That is, a miner receives his mining reward in proportion to his
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Figure 1: A line plot demonstrating a convergence of miners’ reward in our model without
any selfish miner.
mining power.
4.2 One Selfish Miner
As demonstrated in figure 2, a selfish miner who has mining power exceeding a
threshold in both models gains a relative reward more than his relative power,
however our model yields the threshold slightly higher than the conventional
model’s. In particular, a selfish miner requires a relative power of at least 0.34
to effectively use selfish mining strategy in the conventional model, whereas
a power of at least 0.38 is needed in our model.
Such difference could be due to our model’s concurrent mining processes,
which further results in a greater demand of mining power for a selfish mining
strategy to successfully create the longest blockchain.
4.3 Two Selfish Miners
In contrast to the previous setting, a power threshold of selfish mining strat-
egy under this setting is comparatively low. As shown in figure 3a, a power
configuration that has the least amount of selfish miner 1’s power yet still
allows him to gain his unfair amount of reward is M = {0.29, m2, m3} where
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Figure 2: A line plot comparing selfish miner’s average reward and its 95% confidence
interval between the conventional model and our model in one-selfish-miner setting. A
black dashed line indicates an amount of reward the selfish miner would get if he had
followed an honest mining strategy.
m2 ∈ [0.2, 0.31] andm3 has the rest. On the other hand, other power configu-
rations M ′ = {0.29, m2, m3} where m2 /∈ [0.2, 0.31] do not yield extra reward
for selfish miner 1. A plausible cause for the latter might be an insufficient
amount of selfish miner’s power to frequently win against either an honest
miner or the another selfish miner in a race to create the longest blockchain.
Surprisingly, both selfish miners can simultaneously gain their extra re-
wards in some specific power configurations. As demonstrated in figure 4a
and 5b, a power configuration M = {m1, m2, m3} where m1 ∈ [0.29, 0.49]
and m1 = m2 allows both selfish miners to earn their relative rewards higher
than their relative powers. However, their reward amounts become unstable
for any power configuration where both selfish miners’ power equally exceeds
0.33. Specifically, their reward amounts could be lesser than their relative
powers if they equally possess relative power greater than or equal to 0.41.
It is also worth mentioning that (i) a system under this setting is com-
pletely vulnerable to selfish mining strategy for any power configuration
where an honest miner has relative mining power less than 0.44, (ii) as por-
trayed in figure 3b, there are some power configurations M = {m1, m2, m3},
m3 ∈ [0.44, 0.61] that allow an honest miner to retain his reward in propor-
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3: Heat maps of selfish miner 1’s average reward (a), honest miner’s average reward
(b), and their 95% confidence intervals respectively (c,d) in our model with two selfish
miners. In each plot of selfish miner 1’s (a,c), a black line separates power configurations
that yield mining reward greater than his power to the right side and vice versa to the left
side of the plot. Similarly, a black solid line in each plot of honest miner’s (b,d) separates
power configurations that yield reward at least equal to his relative power to the lower
left side and vice versa to the upper right side of the plot. Also, a dashed line separates
power configurations where there is at least 1 selfish miner earning his unfair amount of
reward to the upper right side and vice versa to the lower left side of the plot. Note
that an intersected area between these two lines indicates power configurations where the
honest miner receives his fair share of reward and at least one selfish miner earns his extra
amount of reward as well.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4: Contour plots comparing power configurations that a selfish mining strategy
is effective between our model (a) and the conventional model (b) with 2 selfish miners.
A gray area indicates configurations that only 1 selfish miner gains his unfair amount
of mining reward, whereas a black area indicates configurations that both selfish miners
simultaneously earn their extra amounts of mining reward.
tion to his power whilst also let one selfish miner earn his unfair amount of
reward, and (iii) a power threshold to effectively use selfish mining strategy
under the conventional model is slightly underestimated in comparison to
our model’s. A simulation result of the latter is demonstrated in appendix
A.
4.4 Three Selfish Miners
Due to our limitation of graphically presenting the whole results under this
setting, only maximum reward and minimum reward of selfish miner 1 are
shown in figure 6, where we vary selfish miner 1’s relative power and the
other selfish miners’ combining power. Particular results of our interest are
described in this section.
Unexpectedly, a power threshold that is required for selfish mining strat-
egy becomes even lower in comparison to the previous setting. Specifically,
a selfish miner needs a relative mining power of at very least 0.23 to gain
his unfair amount of mining reward. Corresponding power configurations are
listed in table 1 and a visual overview of selfish miner 1’s reward is demon-
strated in figure 6. Other configurations M = {0.23, m2, m3, m4} where m2
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5: Line plots demonstrating miners’ average reward and their 95% confidence
intervals of a power configuration where all selfish miners possess an equal amount of
mining power. All upper plots (a,b) are simulation results of our model with 2 selfish
miners, whilst all lower plots (c,d) are results of our model with 3 selfish miners. All left
plots (a,c) are simulation results with 100 repetitions each, whereas all right plots (b,d)
are results with 200 repetitions each.
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Table 1: List of power configurations in our model with 3 selfish miners where selfish miner
1 has the least amount of mining power but still earns his unfair amount of mining reward.
m1 m2 Range of m3
0.23
0.15 [0.21, 0.23]
0.16 [0.18, 0.24]
0.17 [0.17, 0.24]
0.18 [0.16, 0.25]
0.19 [0.16, 0.25]
0.20 [0.16, 0.25]
0.21 [0.15, 0.25]
0.22 [0.15, 0.24]
0.23 [0.15, 0.24]
0.24 [0.16, 0.23]
0.25 [0.18, 0.21]
and m3 are outside of the reported range do not yield extra reward for selfish
miner 1. Under such configurations, it is possible that selfish miner 1 does
not have enough mining power to build the longest blockchain.
Moreover, all selfish miners can simultaneously earn their unfair amounts
of mining reward under some particular power configurations. As portrayed
in figure 5d, a power configuration M = {m1, m2, m3, m4} in which m1 ∈
[0.23, 0.33], m1 = m2 = m3, and m4 has the rest allows all selfish miners to
gain their relative rewards greater than their powers. Although, their reward
amounts are unsteady when their relative powers are more than or equal to
0.25. Furthermore, their relative rewards could be lower than their relative
power once they possess power greater than or equal to 0.26. Note that there
are also power configurations where only two selfish miners gain their extra
amounts of reward but the another does not.
In addition, we noticed that (i) a system under this setting where an hon-
est miner has relative power lower than 0.34 is always prone to selfish mining
regardless of any selfish miner’s power configuration, and (ii) there exist
some power configurations M = {m1, m2, m3, m4} where m4 ∈ [0.32, 0.61]
such that an honest miner still earns at least his fair amount of mining re-
ward in proportion to his mining power whilst at least one selfish miner gains
his relative reward more than his relative power.
Although we do not have a simulation result of the conventional model
with 3 selfish miners, it can be expected that a power threshold of selfish
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Table 2: A summary of selfish mining strategy’s power threshold, a range of selfish miner’s
equal powers constituting Nash equilibria, and a safety level of honest miner’s power to
secure Bitcoin system against selfish mining strategy with respect to a number of selfish
miners in our model.
Number of
Selfish Miners
Power Threshold Range of Selfish Miners’ Equal Power Safety Level
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
Stable
Nash Equilibria
Unstable
Nash Equilibria
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
1 0.38* 0.38* - - 0.63* 0.63*
2 0.29 0.50 [0.29, 0.40] [0.41, 0.49] 0.44 0.63
3 0.23 0.50 [0.23, 0.25] [0.26, 0.33] 0.34 0.63
* Due to a low granularity of varying power configurations in our simulation, a relative mining
power 0.38 allows a selfish miner to gain his unfair amount of reward, but a power 0.37 does
not. As a consequence, a safety level becomes 0.63. By a non-linear interpolation, an exact
power threshold for effectively mounting a selfish mining strategy is approximately 0.3786.
mining strategy in our model is slightly greater than one of the conventional
model similarly to the previous setting.
5 Discussion
As summarised in table 2, a lower bound of power threshold or the least
amount of mining power required for selfish mining strategy decreases with
respect to an increase of a number of selfish miners in the system. All power
configurations that result in the lower bound demonstrate the same trait:
a selfish miner has to possess mining power large enough to frequently win
against an honest miner and other selfish miners in a race to create the
longest blockchain.
Generally speaking, the more power a selfish miner has beyond the lower
bound of power threshold, the higher possibility he will earn his unfair
amount of mining reward. That is, the number of power configurations
in which a selfish mining strategy is effective increases in proportion to an
amount of mining power that the selfish miner has.
However, not every power configuration for a specific amount of self-
ish miner’s power between the lower bound and the upper bound of power
threshold always allows him to gain his relative reward greater than his rel-
ative power. In other words, a selfish mining strategy might not be effective
if there is another miner who possesses mining power to a certain degree
greater than the selfish miner himself. As a consequence, a low-power miner
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 6: Heat maps of selfish miner 1’s minimum and maximum average reward (a,b),
honest miner’s minimum and maximum average reward (c,d), and their 95% confidence
intervals respectively (e-h) in our model with 3 selfish miners. In each plot of selfish miner
1’s (a,b,e,f), a black line separates power configurations that yields his relative mining
reward greater than his relative power to the right side and vice versa to the left side of
the plot. Similarly, a black line in each plot of honest miner’s (b,d,g,h) separates power
configurations that yields a relative mining reward at least equal to his relative power to
the bottom left side and vice versa to the top right side of the plot.
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using selfish mining strategy is less likely to frequently create the longest
blockchain and gain his extra mining reward.
Interestingly, there always exists a power configuration where all selfish
miners in the system can simultaneously earn their extra amounts of relative
reward and henceforth it constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Particularly, such
configuration requires all selfish miners to have an equal and sufficiently high
amount of mining power. Since all selfish miners under such configuration
would be worse off switching to an honest mining strategy, a Nash equilibrium
in which all miners do not change to another strategy is formed.
Nevertheless, a power configuration where selfish miners have equally yet
excessively high mining power might not form a stable Nash equilibria. Under
such configuration, all selfish miners have an equal probability of creating a
block at each timestep. However, it is entirely up to chance which selfish
miner consecutively get new blocks and consequently build up his blockchain
longer than the others’. Furthermore, a selfish miner who could not create
the longest blockchain at the previous attempt might be successful in the
subsequent attempt. As such, it results in an unsteady amount of mining
reward which could be lower than their relative mining power. Therefore,
the Nash equilibria that are formed under such configurations are unstable.
From a perspective of security, an amount of mining power to make Bit-
coin system completely secure remains the same. As shown in the table 2, an
upper bound of safety level (or the minimum amount of honest miner’s power
that prevents any configuration of selfish miners’ power) remains constant re-
gardless of any number of selfish miners in the system. An explanation of
the cause is intuitive: there is only one power configuration that requires an
honest miner to possess a relatively great amount of mining power to prevent
selfish mining, namely a configuration where only one selfish miner possesses
mining power but other selfish miners do not. Clearly such configuration
corresponds to a one-selfish-miner setting (or a case where all selfish miners
pool their mining power and work together against an honest miner), and
hence results in the same upper bound of safety level for all other settings.
On the contrary, a lower bound of safety level (or the least amount of
mining power required to prevent selfish mining in at least one specific power
configuration) decreases in proportion to an increase in a number of selfish
miners. By further observation, a power configuration corresponding to the
lower bound is always one where all selfish miners have power equally but
not high enough to gain their unfair amounts of mining reward. It can be
implied that they waste their mining power by trying to create the longest
16
blockchain which is eventually replaced by honest miner’s.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that our model results in a power threshold
slightly greater than one from the conventional model. Though our model of
Bitcoin system might not perfectly reflect the real one, it has demonstrated
an impact of a concurrency of individual mining processes. As a consequence,
all power thresholds of selfish mining strategy and other attacks which were
estimated in other works so far could be slightly underestimated.
6 Conclusion
In this work, a preliminary investigation of selfish mining strategy employed
by multiple miners has been carried out. Based on our empirical results, we
have identified that a lower bound of power threshold required to effectively
use a selfish mining strategy decreases in proportion to a number of self-
ish miners in the system. Nevertheless an upper bound of power threshold
remains constant, namely 0.5, regardless of a number of selfish miners.
Another interesting aspect is an existence of Nash equilibria where a num-
ber of miners use selfish mining strategy and simultaneously gain their rela-
tive mining rewards higher than their relative mining powers. The only re-
quired condition for such outcome is an equal amount of every selfish miner’s
mining power which must be sufficiently large to frequently create a private
blockchain longer than honest miner’s blockchain. Note that the equilibria
could be unstable if their mining powers are excessively high.
On the other hand, a safety level of mining power to be held by non-
malicious miners and completely secure Bitcoin system against selfish mining
remains the same regardless of a number of selfish miners in Bitcoin system.
Last but not least, whilst our model of Bitcoin system is slightly different
to the widely used model, our findings is still valid and demonstrates that a
power threshold for selfish mining strategy and other security attacks might
be slightly underestimated.
A number of interesting questions remain to be further investigated. As
signified in the original study of selfish mining strategy [2], a network capa-
bility of selfish miner is also an important factor that affects how much this
strategy could be effective. Such aspect will be taken into account in our
future work. Moreover, an optimal selfish mining strategy with respect to
multiple selfish miners, similar to one in Sapirshtein’s [7], is yet not known.
With the optimal strategy, it remains to be seen whether our findings is still
17
valid.
A Simulation Result of Conventional Model
in Two-Selfish-Miners Setting
As demonstrated in figure 7, a power configuration that has the least amount
of selfish miner 1’s relative power yet allows him to earn his unfair amount
of mining reward is M = {0.27, m2, m3} where m2 ∈ [0.16, 0.28] and m3 has
the rest. Other configurations M ′ = {0.27, m2, m3} where m2 /∈ [0.16, 0.28]
do not make selfish miner 1 gain his relative reward higher than his relative
power.
In addition, a power configuration M = {m1, m2, m3} in which m1 ∈
[0.27, 0.49], m1 = m2 and m3 has the rest allows both selfish miners to
simultaneously gain their unfair amounts of mining reward. Similarly to the
simulation results of our model, their amounts of mining reward are unstable
when both of them equally possess more than 0.33 and could be less than
their amounts of relative power if both equally have power greater than or
equal to 0.43. Due to a limitation of space in this paper, a plot of these
power configurations is omitted.
Finally, a system under this setting is completely defenceless against
selfish mining if an honest miner possesses a relative mining power less
than or equal to 0.47. In addition, there are some power configurations
M = {m1, m2, m3}, m3 ∈ [0.47, 0.54] where an honest miner still gains his
relative reward no less than his relative power and at least one selfish miner
still earns his unfair amount of reward.
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 7: Heat maps of selfish miner 1’s average reward (a), honest miner’s average reward
(b), their 95% confidence intervals respectively (d,e); and line plots demonstrating miners’
average reward and their 95% confidence intervals of a power configuration where all
selfish miners possess an equal amount of mining power (c,f) in the conventional model
with 2 selfish miners. In each plot of selfish miner 1’s (a,d), a black line separates power
configurations that yield relative mining reward greater than his relative mining power
to the right side and vice versa to the left side of the plot. Similarly, a black solid line
in each plot of honest miner’s (b,e) separates power configurations that yield reward at
least equal to his power to the lower left side and vice versa to the upper right side of the
plot. Similarly, a dashed line separates configurations that at least 1 selfish miner earns
his unfair amount of reward to the upper right side of the plot and vice versa to the lower
left side of the plot. As for line plots, plot (c) is a simulation result with 100 repetitions
each, whereas plot (f) is a simulation result with 200 repetitions.
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